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A Graphic Review of the Free 
Speech Clause 
William Van Alstynet 
A number of years ago, Professors Tussman and tenBroek pub-
lished in this Review an excellent analysis of the equal protection 
clause. 1 Using Venn diagrams, they sought to disaggregate various 
ways of looking at equal protection claims in order to aid our under-
standing of what that clause might mean. Their article was not the first 
word ever published on the equal protection clause, of course, and cer-
tainly it was not meant to be the last. But it did impose an extremely 
helpful clarity on what was even then a murky, undisciplined subject, 
and it filled a gap in the unruly professional literature. Three decades 
later, students of constitutional law still find Tussman-tenBroek graph-
ics a useful starting place. 
A similar presentation of the free speech clause is the main object 
of this Article. Like the Tussman-tenBroek piece, it disaggregates a 
jumble of rival judicial doctrines that purport to define a correct way of 
framing questions arising under the free speech clause. My aim is to 
determine what is at stake among contending interpretations, and to 
see why great importance tends to be attached to such matters. Written 
principally for students, this Article, too, proceeds through a series of 
graphic depictions, each designed to reflect a distinct impression or in-
terpretation of the free speech clause. To be sure, the different con-
structions of the clause reflected in these graphics are not exhaustive.2 
They do embrace, however, nearly all the basic interpretations that 
have competed most strongly for judicial favor during the past century 
of Supreme Court adjudications. The Article begins with the simple, 
t Perkins Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. 
1. Tussman & teuBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALlF. L. REv. 341 (1949). 
2. Three versions that will not be reviewed here are the "bad teudency," "advocacy of 
illegal conduct," and ''no prior restraint" versions. The first tended to characterize the Supreme 
Court majority position throughout the 1920's. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 
(1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
The second was put forward by Learned Hand in Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 
1917), and is well described in Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment 
JJoctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REv. 719 (1975). The third was the sole con-
cern of the common law as summarized in 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE COMMON 
LAW 150-54 (1st Am. ed. 1772), discussed in Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 9-
12 (1942). For an excellent recent review of contending doctrines early in this century, see Rab-
ban, The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 514 (1981). 
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unqualified construction suggested by the face of the clause. Each suc-
cessive depiction purports to respond to some shortcoming or some per-
ceived difficulty in the more literal or rudimentary graphic it aims to 
displace. 
The order of presentation will carry us through a fully developed 
understanding of the free speech clause. The presentation, however, is 
not meant to be faithful to an actual chronology of first amendment 
evolution. The doctrines these graphics represent did not in fact appear 
as they are described here, nor in this order, in the actual case law of 
the first amendment. Indeed, had first amendment doctrine evolved in 
the simple linear fashion reflected in this brief review, that progression 
would be so much a feature of standard casebooks, treatises, and com-
mercial aids that its reiteration in an article would be unwarranted. It 
is, rather, because the case law begins in the middle, as it were, taking 
much of its own theory for granted, and then swings haphazardly from 
historical to functional or pragmatic influences, that a different, quite 
artificial (but more logical) presentation may be needed to clear one's 
perspective. It is the very fact of historical discontinuity in the bur-
geoning case law that provides the occasion for this review. 
What follows purports to put no difficult problems to rest nor even 
preliminarily to examine the newer sorts of first amendment issues that 
are well beyond the scope of any set of introductory graphics. 3 Rather, 
this Article addresses only the most traditional and recurring problem 
of the first amendment: the extent to which government may ban, 
criminalize, or regulate what private citizens seek to say. I mean to 
give a useful account as to why, in addressing that problem, anyone 
needs to do more than read literally ten consecutive words in the first 
amendment: "Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of 
speech." 
The order in which this account is presented will necessarily imply 
that the last graphic is also best. Insofar as the first, simplest formula-
tion of the first amendment proves inadequate to answer some prob-
lem, the success of the next graphic, so smooth and excellent in 
surmounting that problem, will make it appear superior. And so on 
with _each successive change to the end. Despite that appearance of 
steady progress, however, the reader is urged to withhold judgment and 
reserve a healthy skepticism. Each successive interpretation of the free 
speech clause tends to be slightly more complicated. Each thereby di-
rects judicial attention to an increasing assortment of issues. As we 
3. The newer first amendment problems include: socializing communication resources in 
the United States; the government as partisan speaker; the regulation of space satellite companies 
as common carriers; and the perplexing difficulties that arise with the many blends of public-
private property. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
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move along, one is readily persuaded that the more complex is also the 
more sensitive and the more mature. The natural tendency is to think 
we have become more sophisticated, and therefore more correct, in our 
understanding. There is impressive historical evidence, however, that 
this logical complacency may be seriously misplaced. 
In matters of constitutional interpretation, the complex is not nec-
essarily better than the simple. Simple propositions speak bluntly and 
commandingly. Complex propositions full of "ifs," ''unlesses," or "ex-
cepts" do not. Nicely qualified, complex formulations may be neces-
sary and proper for statutory codes. They may be profoundly 
uninspiring in a constitution-the fundamental law of a nation. 
Additionally, a first amendment taken literally and simply is more 
difficult to evade. Graphics that are more mature and intellectually 
pleasing are not better if they but multiply the means by which judges 
may find reasons to give way.4 We may therefore need to worry more 
about standards of judicial review that facilitate judicial discretion and 
the judicial tendency to yield to intolerance than about standards that 
are seemingly too simplistic. This issue is not merely of rhetorical con-
cern, moreover, because historically our judges have tended generally 
to honor the apparent rigor of the free speech clause most when it least 
mattered and least when the judges were most seriously tested. In rela-
tively tranquil times, the words of the first amendment have been given 
considerable force. In times of national anxiety and widespread xeno-
phobia, on the other hand, the same words have frequently been given 
little more than a dismissive acknowledgment.5 In the critical litera-
ture, the many successful prosecutions beginning with the Sedition Act 
of 1798,6 the Espionage Act of World War I/ and the Smith Act fol-
4. Consider Justice Black's very forceful remarks in Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 
109, 143-44 (1961) (dissenting opinion): 
To apply the Court's balancing test ... is to read the First Amendment to say 
'Congress shall pass no law abridging freedom of speech, press, assembly and petition, 
unless Congress and the Supreme Court reach the joint conclusion that on balance the 
interest of the Government in stifling those freedoms is greater than the interest of the 
people in having them exercised.'. . . [U]nless we once again accept the notion that the 
Bill of Rights means what it says and that this Court must enforce that meaning, I am of 
the opinion that our great Charter of liberty will be more honored in the breach than in 
the observance. 
See also Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 61-65 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting); Reich, Mr. 
Justice Block and the Living Constitution, 16 HARV. L. Rev. 673, 736-44 (1963). 
5. See, e.g., Z. CHAFEE, supra note 2, at 563 (''The Supreme Court ... can do nothing to 
keep discussion open during an emergency."). 
6. Act of July 21, 1798, ch. 74, §II, 1 Stat. 596, critically reviewed in L. LEVY, LEGACY OF 
SUPPRESSION (1960) and J. SMITH, FREEDOM'S FETIERS-THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS AND 
AMERICAN CML LIBERTIES (1956). 
7. Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217. See also Sedition Act of May 16, 
1918, ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553, critically reviewed in Z. CHAFEE, supra note 2, at 36-140, in which the 
author states that-in-more-than 2,000 prosecutions, "[a]lmost all the convictions were for expres-
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lowing World War II, 8 are offered as depressing examples. 
At the end of our brief graphic excursion through the free speech 
clause, therefore, it may be both provocative and important for the 
reader to look back one last time to the beginning. We shall have 
moved a fair distance intellectually-but not necessarily a good or reas-
suring distance politically. Indeed, at the end, one may privately count 
it heavily against the practical wisdom of any doctrine that answers 
smoothly to every kind of problem, but yields in practice to an ancien 
regime intolerant of civil liberty. There is no more durable or worth-
while problem than this in our constitutionallaw,9 and even now we 
have very little reason to think we have mastered it. More embarrass-
ing still, it is far from clear that we are even on the right track. 
I 
THE LITERAL CONSTRUCTION 
In respect to freedom of speech, the first amendment is exception-
ally crisp and unambiguous. Thus, it provides: Congress shall make no 
law abridging the freedom of speech. Most of the principal affirmative 
restrictions on government power are far more ambiguous or equivo-
cal. For instance, the fourth amendment protects "the right of the peo-
ple to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects" only 
against "unreasonable searches and seizures." The fifth amendment as-
sures each person that he or she will not be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without "due process." The eighth amendment prohibits 
only such bail or such fines as are "excessive" and forbids only "cruel 
and unusual punishments." 
From the style of these amendments, it is quite clear that the rights 
or freedoms they secure are limited. Each contains an obvious negative 
pregnant. Fines that are not excessive, for instance, are evidently per-
mitted. One may, likewise, even be deprived of life assuming only that 
the legal process was appropriate (j. e. , that "due" process was ob-
served). Additionally, the necessary referents of the crucial adjectives 
that are not self-defining ("unreasonable," "due," "excessive," "cruel," 
"unusual") lie outside the words of the Constitution. They not only 
permit interpretation by external reference; they direct such an exercise. 
The first amendment is strikingly different. On its face, it is both 
sions of opinion about the merits and conduct of the war," id. at p. 51; A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, 
THE AMERICAN CoNSTITUTION: ITS ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT 664-70 (1955). 
8. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1976), described and reviewed in 1 T. EMERSON, D. HABER, & N. DOR· 
SEN, PoLmCAL AND CIVIL RiGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 104-55 (3d ed. 1967). 
9. The most recent and able review of this problem is Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its 
A/lure and Impossibility, 53 IND. LJ. 399 (1978), reprinted in 1. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 
I-41 (1980). 
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unequivocal and absolute. It requires no arcane learning to understand 
the clear and plain meaning of "Congress," "no law," "abridging," or 
"speech." To "abridge" means not merely to forbid altogether, but to 
curtail or to lessen. And the laws forbidden to Congress are not merely 
such as "unreasonably" abridge speech (cf., the fourth amendment), 
nor are they laws that are "excessive" abridgments of speech. The im-
perative is simple, straightforward, complete, and absolute: Congress 
shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech. 
None of this is to say that no difficult questions of construction 
arise under the first amendment. They are. questions, however, that 
arise only in instances where the facts are not clearly within the terms 
of the amendment. For instance, an act of Congress making it a crime 
to criticize the president, as applied to a person speaking critically of 
the president, is plainly within the amendment and therefore plainly 
unconstitutional. Whether an act of Congress making it a crime to de-
stroy a draft registration card is also within the amendment, on the 
other hand, may be debatable; it is contingent upon. one's view of 
equating the tearing of a pasteboard in the course of a speech against 
the draft with speech. Io Similarly, an act of Congress making it a crime 
to criticize any federal judge is plainly within the amendment and, ac-
cordingly, invalid. On the other hand, whether an attempt by a federal 
judge to silence either a witness in court or speakers outside the court-
room also raises any kind of first amendment issues is a different (and 
more difficult) question. The amendment says only that Congress shall 
make no law abridging the freedom of speech; on its face, the first 
amendment is not directed either to the judiciary or to the executive. II 
If the source of abridgment is a law made by Congress and if what 
10. It is not speech, of course, but there may be persuasive instrumental reasons for deeming 
it so. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (burning of draft cards, in the setting of an 
anti-war rally, giveu marginal first amendment protection). 
11. A surprising number of commentators have concluded that, for this reason alone, the 
first amendment cannot be taken literally because it would leave unrestrained, incorrigible oppor-
tunities for the executive and judicial departments of the United States to suppress free speech in 
ways that must have been meant to be forbidden under the first amendment. It is not clear, 
however, whether such easy criticism is well founded. The extent of the problem depends partly 
upon one's view ofhow much of the executive power and how much of the judicial power do not 
depend upon acts of Congress. 
Most of what the President can do may in fact be derived from enabling legislation by Con-
gress, rather than by force of his power as provided for in article II. The same is true of our 
federal courts under article DI. When particular uses of the executive and judicial power proceed 
pursuant to authorizations and enabling legislation by Congress, they are subject to the first 
amendment, which makes no exception for acts of Congress merely becanse they may also be in 
aid of the executive or judicial powers, as distinct from acts of Congress in aid of its own enumer-
ated powers. The consequence may be that the actual ambit of executive and judicial power 
unaffected by a literal first amendment (because not consequential to any act of Congress) would 
be very small, confined at the outset, and not as important to restrict as that of Congress. I have 
dealt with this problem obliquely in a different article, however, and there is little reason to deal 
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the law expressly abridges is speech, however, the amendment itself 
appears to end the inquiry. 12 What kind of speech is involved (e.g., 
whether political or commercial, private or public, obscene or religious) 
is, on the face of the amendment, not a question. And equally, whether 
the speech seems trivial rather than important, reprehensible rather 
than edifying, or remarkably insightful rather than fraught with dan-
ger, are also not questions. For the point, again, is that while one may 
always have an appropriate interest as to how this amen~ment came 
about (e.g., what purposes it was meant to serve, why it was proposed, 
whether as approved and ratified it enacted a proposition thoughtful 
people would find entirely too dogmatic), it is nonetheless this amend-
ment that did come about. 13 If one finds it too strong or ridiculous 
(e.g., if one thinks it should be recast in terms consistent with the mod-
eration of the fourth, fifth, and eighth amendments, or if one thinks 
that nothing more than a speech fetishism could account for such an 
with it here. See Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in J)etermining Incidental Powers of the Pres/· 
dent and of the Federal Courts, 40 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 102 (1976). 
12. The inquiry may not be ended if it is the kind of speech that the copyright clause enables 
Congress to confide an exclusive property right in others to control pursuant to its power under 
art. I, § 8, cl. 8, ''to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times 
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." For 
an opening discussion, see Nimmer, J)oes Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantee of 
Free Speech and Press?, 11 U.C.LA L. REV. 1180 (1970). 
13. Note, for instance, how the first amendment differs from the second amendment in this 
respect. The first amendment does not link the protection it provides with any particular objective 
and may, accordingly, be deemed to operate without regard to anyone's view of how well the 
speech it protects may or may not serve such an objective. The second amendment expressly links 
the protection it provides with a stated objective ("A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the 
security of a free state") and might, therefore, be deemed to operate only insofar as the right it 
protects ("the right of the people to keep and bear arms") can be shown to be connected with that 
objective. 
The different modes of the first and second amendments are not unique in this regard. The 
enumeration of powers vested in Congress, in art. I, § 8, reflects a similar difference. For instance, 
whatever the reasons contributing to the grant, the vesting of power in Congress to "regulate 
co=erce among the several states" is textually not bounded by any statement of purpose or 
objective in respect to the exercise of that power. On the other hand, the vesting of power in 
Congress to secure "to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries" has two textual qualifications. The first may be implied by the introductory phrase 
accompanying the grant of power, that this power is vested in Congress "to promote the Progress 
of Science and useful Arts." The second is express, in that the power is one to grant an "exclusive 
Right" for "limited Times," and not in perpetuity. Thus, while the Supreme Court might defer to 
Congress on both matters, it might also, consistent with the text, check Congress with respect to 
either matter. The Court might, for example, hold unconstitutional a vesting of exclusive patent 
or copyright that in the Court's view has no rational connection with promoting the progress of 
science or any useful art, or it might hold unconstitutional a vesting of exclusive patent or copy· 
right that in the Court's view is unnecessarily long or excessive to fair protection. On the other 
hand, the court would regard the co=erce power as plenary, as indeed it has in an overwhelm· 
ing number of cases. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946) (congres· 
sionally approved discriminatory state tax statute sustained); Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 
(1903) (act of Congress destroying, rather than enhancing, interstate co=erce sustained); Gib· 
bons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I (1824). 
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amendment), article V of the Constitution provides a mechanism for 
implementing the change that requisite majorities in Congress and in 
the states may prefer. In the meantime, we have the first amendment as 
it appears and, as it does appear it is in contrast to, rather than in simi-
larity to, the moderation of other provisions in the Bill of Rights. A 
suitable graphic of the first amendment might therefore look like this: 
Acts of 
Congress 100% Protected 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
There are no lines, no intersecting points, no shaded areas of less pro-
tected or of unprotected speech. The graphic, though singularly unin-
teresting, is also perfect and inviolate. 
II 
''THE" FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
Despite the simplicity and logical force of a literal interpretation of 
the first amendment, it has never commanded a majority of the 
Supreme Court. Primarily it has failed against the pressures of irresis-
tible counterexamples, rationalized by an uncertain early history. An 
"irresistible counterexample" is an instance that is plainly within the 
literal prohibition of the amendment, but that one is nonetheless un-
willing to defend. The necessary consequence is to concede that there 
must be some degree of moderation contemplated by the first amend-
ment despite first impressions to the contrary. 
Possibly the best known counterexample is a variation of an in-
stance used by Mr. Justice Holmes: a person knowingly and falsely 
shouting "Fire!" in a crowded theater for the perverse joy of anticipat-
ing the spectacle of others being trampled to death as the panicked 
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crowd surges toward the theater exit. 14 The counterexample could as 
well be: the mere oral statement of one person to another, offering to 
pay $5,000 for the murder of the offeror's spouse; a Congressman's 
bribe solicitation; an interstate manufacturer's deliberately false and 
misleading commercial advertisements; a witness committing perjury 
in the course of a trial; or a member of the public interrupting (by 
speaking) someone else already speaking at a city council meeting. The 
counterexample need not be more complicated than a simple, soft 
statement made to the president that he will be shot if he fails to veto a 
particular bill or fails to grant a certain pardon. 
Some of these examples may be defended (ie., some persons will 
be willing to defend some of them as protected by the first amend-
ment), and some may be distinguished (ie., it will be said that they do 
not involve speech or that, rather, they involve "speech plus"). 15 Most 
of us, however, will recognize that this second response is a mere cavil. 
Lying on the witness stand is not less speech than lying about the 
weather (or, for that matter, than telling the truth about the weather), 
although it may also be perjury. The shout of "Fire!" is not less speech 
in the Holmes instance than the shout of "Fire!" from the mouth of an 
actor on the stage of the same theater, spoken as but a word in a play. 16 
It is futile to argue that an appropriately tailored law that punishes any 
or all of these utterances does not abridge speech. It does, it is meant 
to, and one should not take recourse to verbal subterfuge, e.g. , that it is 
"speech-brigaded-with-action" or "conduct" alone that is curtailed by 
laws reaching these cases. These ersatz arguments prove too much; the 
same definitional artifices must necessarily operate to demolish the sim-
ple, compelling picture of a literal first amendment. 
The objection of the irresistible counterexample thus upsets one's 
14. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (''The most stringent protection of free 
speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.''), 
15. In several cases, Justice Black wrote strongly and approvingly of a first amendment with 
no exceptions. See, e.g., his opinions in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293 (1964) 
(Black, J., concurring); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 56 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting); 
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 140 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting). Even so, his own 
discernment of "speech plus" led him to vote to sustain many laws believed to be unconstitutional 
under the first amendment even by more conservative colleagues not sharing his "absolute" com-
mitment to the first amendment. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Street v. New 
York, 394 U.S. 576,609 (1969) (Blaek, J., dissenting); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 
503,515 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting); Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Brown v. Louisiana, 
383 U.S. 131, 151 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965); Giboney v. 
Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949). See also Kalven, Upon Rereading Mr. Jus/lee 
Black on lhe Firs/ Amendment, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 428 (1967). Efforts at such distinctions have 
created difficulties for other "strong" first amendment writers as well. See, e.g., T. EMERSON, THE 
SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION "80·89 (1970). 
16. The point has not escaped theatrical parody. See T. STOPPARD, ROSENCRANTZ & 
GUILDENSTERN ARE DEAD, Act II, at 60 (1967). 
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confidence in an absolute freedom of speech, despite the singular lan-
guage of the first amendment itself. And, on closer examination, even 
the language of the first amendment may provide explicit accommoda-
tion (f. e., exclusion) of an indefinite number of these counterexamples. 
Specifically, it provides (merely) that: Congress shall make no law 
abridging the freedom of speech. 
In complete fidelity to that language, a graphic depiction of the 
first amendment might look like this: 
Acts of 
Congress 
100% Protected 
"THE" FREEDOM OF SPEECH (Criminal 
Perjury 
Obscenity (?) 
Defamation (J) 
Commercial 
fraud(?) 
Etc.) 
According to this view, 17 the first amendment is still quite different 
from several other amendments. When it applies, it applies abso-
lutely-without balancing or weighing circumstances. Thus, it still 
stands in contrast to the fourth amendment ("unreasonable" .searches 
and seizures), the fifth amendment ("due" process), or the eighth 
amendment ("cruel and unusual" punishments). Consistent with this 
understanding, however, is the necessity of determining whether speech 
abridged by a given act of Congress is not within "the" freedom of 
speech that Congress may make no law abridging. And here, admit-
17. This view is evidently shared by seemingly "strong" first amendment proponents such as 
Zechariah Chafee. See Z. CHAFEE, Stlpra note 2, at 14, 145, 149-50 ("We can all agree that the 
free speech clauses do not wipe out tli.e common law as to obscenity, profanity, and defamation of 
individuals .... [O]bscenity, profanity, and gross libels upon individuals ... fall outside the 
protection of the free speech clauses as I have defined them . . . (as do criminal solicitation or 
even talking "scurrilously about the flag]."). See also Justice Holmes' opinion in Frohwerk v. 
United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919) ("We venture to believe that neither Hamilton nor 
Madison, nor any other competent person then or later, ever supposed that to make criminal the 
counseling of a murder ... would be an unconstitutional interference with speech."). Other (and 
much more dispiriting) early Holmes opinions are comprehensively reviewed in Rabban, SlljJTO 
note 2, at 533-40. 
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tedly, nothing in the language of the amendment itself is definitive or 
even helpful. Some external referent must be used to provide the dis-
tinction between that speech within "the" freedom of speech and that 
speech not within it. 
It is noteworthy, however, that there is still no balancing or weigh-
ing of circumstances so far as the first amendment is concerned, which-
ever side of the line particular speech may lie. If it is within "the" 
freedom of speech, as we have already noted, it is absolutely protected. 
If it is not within "the" freedom of speech, the first amendment (by its 
own terms) does not affect it at all. Correspondingly, the first amend-
ment imposes no special burden on Congress to justify laws abridging 
utterances not within "the" freedom of speech. The amendment is not 
directed to those utterances; it demands nothing of laws presuming to 
abridge such speech. Accordingly, it is inappropriate to require that 
any sort of "clear and present danger'' be proved in respect to such 
speech for the very same reason that, on the other side of the line, it 
remains utterly irrelevant for government to try to prove some sort of 
"clear and present danger'' to defend an abridgment. 
The second graphic is thus fundamentally like the first graphic in 
respect to a common characteristic that continues to distinguish it from 
other portions of the Bill of Rights-the quality of absoluteness that 
makes balancing irrelevant. It differs from tli.e first graphic only with 
respect to the unsettling uncertainty it introduces by compelling an un-
specified external reference to settle the content of "the" freedom of 
speech. The proper reference is to . . . what? There is obviously no 
appendix attached to the first amendment that authoritatively lists the 
varieties of speech within and without "the" freedom of speech. And 
neither has anyone claimed discovery of such a lucid, uniform, and 
established consensus respecting "the" freedom of speech in 1789 such 
that, by clear convention, its content was (or is) universally obvious. 18 
To a significant extent, however, the second graphic is reflected in 
18. For example, Professor Chafee concluded that the central minimum intention of the 
drafters and ratifiers of the first amendment was "to wipe out the common law of sedition, and 
make further prosecutions for criticism of the government, without any incitement to law-break-
ing, forever impossible in the United States of America." Z. CHAFEE, supra note 2, at 21. The 
Supreme Court has accepted this conclusion. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 
(1964) ("Although the Sedition Act was never tested in this Court, the attack upon its validity has 
carried the day in the court of history. . . . [There has been] a broad consensus that the Act, 
because of the restraint it imposed upon criticism of government and public officials, was inconsis-
tent with the First Amendment."). 
The matter, however, did not always appear so clear. There is, for instance, a growth in the 
impressions of Justice Holmes on the same question who wrote in 1907: 
[T]he main purpose of such constitutional provisions is 'to prevent all such previous re-
straints upon publications as had been practiced by other governments,' and they do not 
prevent the subsequent punishment of such as may be deemed contrary to the public 
welfare. 
Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907). 
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the case law of the first amendment. The Supreme Court has treated 
speech deemed "obscene," for instance, as not within ''the" freedom of 
speech absolutely protected by the first amendment. Rather, the case 
law neither absolutely protects obscene speech nor even requires any 
first amendment compelled justification for its criminalization. 19 And 
in general, the same holds true for ordinary criminal solicitation,20 as it 
once did (although no longer does) for libel, "fighting words,"21 and 
Then, by 1919, he wrote: 
It well may be that the prohibition of laws abridging the freedom of speech is not con-
fined to previous restraints, although to prevent them may have been the main purpose, 
as intimated in Patterson v. Colorado . . . . 
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1919). 
Finally, much ruore emphatically in the same year, he stated: 
I wholly disagree with the argument of the Government that the First Amendment left 
the common law as to seditious libel in force. History seems to me against the notion. 
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting opinion). 
Yet, in 1960, Professor Levy reluctantly concluded: 
If ... a choice must be made between two propositions, first, that the clause [i.e., the 
freedom of speech-and-press clause] substantially embodied the Blackstonian definition 
and left the law of seditious libel in force, or second, that it repudiated Blackstone and 
superseded the common law, the known evidence points strongly in support of the for-
mer proposition. Contrary to Justice Holmes, history favors the notion. 
L. LEVY, supra note 6, at 248 (1960). 
19. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S 476,483,485 (1957) ("In light of this history, it is appar-
ent that the unconditional phrasing of the First Amendment was not intended to protect every 
utterance. . . . We hold that obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech 
or press."). The principle was subsequently reaffirmed. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 
(1973) ("This much has been categorically settled by the Court, that obscene material is unpro-
tected by the First Amendment."). The ruost recent effort to defend this distinction is Schauer, 
Speech and "Speech "-Obscenity and "Obscenity'~· An Exercise in the Interpreting of Constitutional 
Language, 67 GEO. LJ. 899, 905-06 (1979). See also T. EMERSON, supra note 15, at 401-12. A 
more general defense of "definitional balancing" (!:e., judicially defining which kinds of speech 
are, and which are not, within the protection of the first amendment) is presented in Nimmer, The 
Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to 
Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 935 (1968). 
20. The subject is comprehensively reviewed in Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, 1980 AM. B. 
FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 645. 
21. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) ("There are certain well-
defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have 
never been thought to raise any constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the 
profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words.") (emphasis added), overruled in part, 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 255, 268 (1964) ("[L]ibel can claim no talismanic 
immunity from constitutional limitations. It ruust be measured by standards that satisfy the First 
Amendment."). See also Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520 (1972) (reversing conviction of 
person scufiling with a police officer who had told him, "White son of a bitch, I'll kill you"; ''you 
son of a bitch, I'll choke you to death"); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (modifying 
Chaplinsky to apply only when the willfully provocative language "rises far above public incon-
venience, annoyance, or unrest," without regard to whether it "stirs people to anger''). For an 
impressive recent case, see Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Ill.), qjf'd, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th 
Cir. 1978) (proposed Nazi march planned for neighborhood inhabited by many Jews personally 
victims of German concentration camps). See also Skokie v. National Socialist Party, 69 Ill. 2d 
605, 373 N.E.2d 21 (1978). 
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"commercial speech."22 Since none of these is within "the" freedom of 
speech that Congress may make no law abridging, Congress has been 
allowed to abridge these kinds of speech except insofar as other kinds 
of constitutional constraints lying outside the first amendment may af-
fect the problem (e.g., constraints of enumerated powers, due process, 
or fifth amendment standards of equal protection). 
III 
DETERMINING THE BOUNDARIES OF "THE" FREEDOM 
OF SPEECH 
Even if the definitional boundary between "the" freedom of 
speech, which may not be abridged, and speech that may be abridged is 
the sole uncertainty respecting the first amendment, the picture pro-
vided by the second graphic may be somewhat incomplete. If we stipu-
late that Congress shall make no law abridging "the" freedom of 
speech, it remains important to secure absolute protection of whatever 
speech is protected. Advertently or otherwise, however, in making laws 
abridging unprotected speech, Congress may in fact make a law that 
abridges the protected freedom of speech. If it drafts a postal obscenity 
law too broadly, for instance, the law thus made by Congress may at 
once "abridge" speech that itself is within "the" freedom of speech, 
although no one in fact has yet been prosecuted. Or if interstate "crim-
inal solicitation" is outlawed by Congress, the uncertainty of the of-
fense may at once abridge (i.e. , curtail) solicitations within the freedom 
of speech said to be absolutely protected. If, in addition, the sanctions 
are extremely severe and/or the procedures attending enforcement of 
the act of Congress quite summary, then the foreseeable prohibited 
abridging effects are more obvious and more substantial. In brief, 
under the view we are now examining, when the first amendment ap-
plies, it applies absolutely. And the amendment does not merely pro-
vide that no one may be jailed or fined for utterances within "the" 
freedom of speech. Rather, it provides that Congress shall make no law 
abridging the freedom of speech. The amendment stands violated by 
the making of a law insofar as the making itself abridges "the" freedom 
of speech. 
One way of enforcing the prohibition (to halt the immediate 
abridging effects from the mere making of such laws) would be to pro-
vide a citizen's right of immediate appeal to the courts, incidental to the 
22. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), overruled in pari, Virginia State Bd. of 
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 760-62 (1976) ("Here, •.• (the] 
question whether there is a First Amendment exception for 'commercial speech' is squarely before 
ns .... Our question, then, is whether this communication is wholly outside the protection of the 
First Amendment. . . . Our answer is that it is not."). 
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mere enactment by Congress of any law dealing with speech. The 
function of the appeal, of course, would be to determine at once 
whether the speech thus dealt with by Congress is in whole or in part 
within ''the" freedom of speech protected by the first amendment, in 
which case the law ought at once to be judicially set aside. A less per-
fect procedure will require a longer delay before an act of Congress can 
come to the Court. By definition, during the delay that occurs after 
Congress has made the law and prior to its authoritative adjudication, 
the first amendment will stand violated. To the extent that other doc-
trines nonetheless operate to create such delays (e.g., the case or contro-
versy requirement of article III or ancillary requirements of standing), 
in fact the first amendment will not have been effective.23 On the other 
hand, some speech not within "the" freedom of speech will go unpun-
ished if the entire law, when :finally adjudicated, is held wholly invalid 
because of the overbreadth or vagueness of only some of its provi-
sions.24 A modified graphic that takes both kinds of effects into ac-
count may therefore look like this: 
23. See, e.g., Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972) (allegations of present speech-inhibiting 
consequences of Army intelligence surveillance of dissident civilian groups held insufficient to 
secure ripeness or standing under article III); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971) (allegations of 
chilling effect from enacted antispeech criminal statutes insufficient); United Pub. Workers v. 
Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (denial of declaratory judgment sought by federal civil servants alleg-
ing they were intimidated from pursuing particular political activities by a federal statute prohibit-
ing "any active part in political management or in political campaigns."). An exceptionally able 
review of this subject is provided in Albert, Justiciabr1ity and Theories of Judicial Review: A Re-
mote Relationship, 50S. CAL. L. REv. 1139 (1977). 
24. In this respect, the Supreme Court does take the first amendment literally. It examines 
the law as made and holds it invalid if, as made, the law abridges speech, even though as applied 
the law does not contravene the first amendment because the speech involved is not protected. See 
e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520 (1972) ("It matters not that the words appellee used 
might have been constitutionally prohibited under a narrowly and precisely drawn statute."). See 
also Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) (conviction reversed due to facial overbreadth of 
ordinance); Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969) (conviction reversed because ordi-
nance as drafted was unconstitutionally broad, although as subsequently construed by state 
supreme court it would presumably be valid as applied to the very facts of the case). The use of 
these doctrines thus tends to offset the inability of parties to secure a more timely adjudication of 
an act when first made, although at the corresponding cost of enabling some guilty (i.e., otherwise 
punishable) parties to go free. 
In one respect, the doctrines of "void-on-its-face" for first amendment overbreadth and/or 
vagueness are identical to the exclusionary rule disallowing evidence gained by means incousis-
tent with fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. See Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961):.-In the one case, the "criminal" goes free because the constable blun-
dered. In the other, the criminal goes free because the legislature blundered. Still, there are 
grounds for distinguishing the bases of the two rules. Nothing in the text of the fourth amendment 
itself precludes the use of evidence, however wrongfully secured. But, since the text of the first 
amendment forbids Congress to make a law abridging protected speech, when the only law appli-
cable abridges speech, it is logical for a court to hold that it cannot be invoked. For an able review 
of rationales addressed to these problems, see Be Vier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: 
An Inquiry into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299 (1978). 
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The third graphic presents a discouraging picture of a first amend-
ment less perfect and less self-executing than the first depiction in two 
respects we have noted. First, consistent with its own language and 
consistent with a number of irresistible counterexamples, the third 
graphic, like the second graphic, admits that there are kinds of speech 
not within "the" freedom of speech. The more discouraging conse-
quence of this observation, moreover, is that the amendment itself not 
only fails explicitly to list those excluded kinds of speech, but on its 
face, provides no clue as to what they are. Necessarily, then, courts are 
compelled to discover them at large with ample room to reach differing 
enumerations. This latitude subjects much of first amendment adjudi-
cation to fashions of judicial discretion. 
Second, because the Constitution itself provides no mechanism to 
perfect an appeal from Congress, congressional abridgments of "the" 
protected freedom of speech may not be immediately challenged, 
which allows the literal command of the first amendment prohibiting 
the making of such laws to be defeated. The discretion of the judiciary 
in determining when a case may be brought and who may bring it also 
operates to commit the actual fate of "the" freedom of speech to judi-
cial vagary. Much of "the" freedom of speech thus may be effectively 
curtailed by the intimidating presence of the outstanding act of Con-
gress. Judicial sympathy with the unconstitutional objectives of the act 
also may conspire to defeat the command of the amendment by opera-
tion to impose severe restrictions on the testing of that law. 
But in neither respect is the resulting situation much avoidable, 
insofar as it appears, substantially, to be an intrinsic problem of the 
first amendment exactly as it is drawn. To put the matter differently, 
1982] FREE SPEECH CLAUSE 121 
these shortcomings are not solely the result of a studied effort to limit 
the scope of the first amendment. Although they can be exacerbated by 
congressional or judicial hostility, they arise essentially because of the 
amendment's language, the inevitability of congressional error, and the 
limitations of judicial review. 
On the bright side, however, the third graphic still has much to 
commend it. So long as an utterance is within "the" freedom of speech 
contemplated by the amendment and its prohibition is subject to judi-
cial review, it remains fully and unequivocally protected. Passion, def-
erence, and bias in the judiciary may make the line between "the" 
freedom of speech and unprotected speech discouragingly unstable, but 
at least they may not operate twice-once to define the boundary and 
still again to balance away even fully protected speech against some 
notion of reasonable or necessary abridgments. 
IV 
THE BOUNDED SCOPE OF ''THE FREEDOM" OF SPEECH 
The logical force of the second and third graphics lies in their ac-
commodation of irresistible counterexamples and almost literal consis-
tency with the complete language of the first amendment. However, 
there is an alternative equally responsive to both concerns. Indeed, it 
may be superior to both the second and third graphics insofar as it 
eliminates the boundary between "the" freedom of speech (which alone 
is protected by the amendment) and other speech placed outside the 
amendment's protection. This alternative view thus forecloses any 
claim of judicial discretion to fix an unstable boundary and, to that 
extent, is superior. 
This alternative falls back on the language of the first amendment 
to embrace the common-sense impression with which we started: all 
speech is protected from abridging laws made by Congress without ex-
ception. That the speech at issue is a fragment of perjured testimony 
does not make it any less speech nor remove it from the amendment. It 
stands initially on exactly the same footing as a political candidate's 
unexceptional campaign remarks, or an ordinary citizen's street comer 
complaints about national economic policy. 
The instance of the irresistible counterexample is met, moreover, 
not by question-begging verbal artifices (e.g., by calling it "conduct," 
"speech-brigaded-with-action," or "speech-acts"), but by a different 
and more general definition of "the freedom of speech" that Congress 
may make no law abridging. ''The freedom of speech" that Congress 
may make no law abridging is a qualifYing phrase, albeit not in the 
manner suggested in graphics two or three. Rather, "the freedom of 
speech" that Congress may not by law abridge is a reference to some 
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scope of freedom implied by the very term "the freedom" and, logi-
cally, therefore, a scope of freedom bounded. In short, it stands not as 
a synonym for complete freedom, but as a contrast with complete free-
dom. "The freedom" of speech that Congress may make no law 
abridging is therefore that degree, or that extent, of freedom of speech 
that Congress may make no law abridging. 
This view of the amendment abandons judicial discretion to say 
what is and what is not the subject matter of speech protected by the 
amendment-although it necessarily asserts an alternative discretion to 
say what is the scope of "the freedom of speech" within the meaning of 
"the freedom" as distinct from unlimited or unqualified complete free-
dom. Again, and unavoidably, it compels even a conscientious and re-
luctant judiciary to utilize some reference external to the first 
amendment to determine that scope. Thus, it inevitably reintroduces 
instability into the first amendment, although in a different way. But 
the instability is another instance that caunot be helped, since the force 
of the irresistible counterexample will not go away and the very lan-
guage of the first amendment contributes to the integrity of coping with 
it in this fashion (quite apart from the highly uncertain history associ-
ated with the amendment). A graphic depiction of the first amendment 
thus described might look like this: 
''THE FREEDOM" 
OF SPEECH 
100% Protected 
SPEECH BEYOND 
''THE FREEDOM" 
0% Protected 
All Kinds of Speech 
Note, then, these several features. First, all speech is encompassed 
by the amendment, whether it be talk about the weather, one's choice 
of elected representatives, or procuring heroin. Second, "the freedom" 
of speech refers to a latitude, rather than to a subject or a kind of 
speech. Third, the exclusive question in each case is merely whether 
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the utterances were within that latitude of freedom of speech compris-
ing "the freedom" of speech that Congress may make no law abridging. 
And the irresistible counterexample is accounted for insofar as it may 
be expected to fall outside the latitude of "the freedom" of speech, al-
beit the referent for determining whether it does is not provided by the 
first amendment itself and necessarily, therefore, requires the judiciary 
to look elsewhere. 
To a considerable extent, this view of the first amendment has not 
only characterized a substantial number of Supreme Court decisions, 
but also dominated the entire first amendment case law. Indeed, the 
main struggle has been among contending views respecting the appro-
priate test according to which speech is held to be either within "the 
freedom" of speech protected from abridging laws, or beyond that free-
dom and therefore unaffected by the first amendment. A leading ex-
ample is the following formulation proposed by Judge Learned Hand 
and approved by a Supreme Court majority in 1951 in .Dennis v. United 
States: "In each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,' 
discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as 
is necessary to avoid the danger."25 Note the discrete elements of this 
formulation, and especially the several unavoidable determinations 
that it commits to the judiciary. Most obviously, it commits to the judi-
ciary a textually unaided directive to rank-order all possible "evils." 
As well, of course, it implicitly directs a determination of what legisla-
tures are constitutionally empowered to define as evil for purposes of 
criminalizing speech likely to produce that evil. The determination of 
what may be deemed evils and the rank-order of their gravities is im-
perative, because the requisite degree of probability sufficient to place 
particular speech beyond "the freedom" of speech forbidden to be 
abridged is itself dependent upon the evil's gravity. The greater evil, 
the less probable need be its occurrence to forbid speech generating 
some tendency that the evil might occur. The particular formulation 
looks like this: 
25. 341 u.s. 494, 510 (1951). 
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The vertical axis is graduated from zero probability to absolute 
certainty. The horizontal axis is graduated from evils of zero gravity to 
those of absolute gravity. The diagonal line cutting across the graphic 
marks the boundary of that scope of speech within "the freedom" of 
speech that Congress may make no law abridging. All cases to the left 
of the line are protected. All cases to the right of the line are 
unprotected. 
Two examples illustrate the apparent objectivity and completeness 
of the arrangement. The first example of simple trespass is drawn from 
an opinion by Mr. Justice Brandeis.26 It supposes that a legislature has 
made it a crime (albeit a minor one) for persons to be on the private 
property of another knowing that the owner does not want them. It is 
assumed that the trespass law is itself valid (ie., that the legislature 
may protect private property in this fashion and deem officious intru-
sions an evil within the police power to prevent). It is assumed also 
that the trespass is fairly mild-trespassing on a privately owned vacant 
lot, for instance, as distinct from trespassing upon another's bedroom at 
night. The case likewise supposes the same legislature adopted a law to 
discourage the incident of trespass by making it a minor crime for any 
person to advocate, urge, counsel, incite, or teach to others the desirab-
lity of trespassing. 
The law thus punishes speech. But it is not on that account either 
valid or invalid, for its validity requires that in each case we discount 
26. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377-78 (1927) (concurring opinion). 
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the gravity of the evil (which is not the speech but rather an act of 
trespass) by its improbability. Since the evil (simple trespass) is a com-
paratively trivial evil, nothing less than virtual certainty that it would 
occur unless the speech were forbidden will suffice to justify proceeding 
against the speaker. So, if an anarchist urges a handful of half-inter-
ested citizens to trespass on a posted vacant lot in order to demonstrate 
their objection to a social order that sanctifies private property, the 
speaker cannot be convicted when it is plain no one did as the speaker 
urged, nor was likely to do so. All such trivial evil-inducing speech is 
within that latitude of "the freedom" of speech protected by the first 
amendment save that which actually engenders the evil to be avoided 
or, at least, very nearly engenders it. Most such cases are thus "P" 
(protected) cases on the graph. Very few will be "UP" (unprotected). 
The converse is true for homicide. The killing of people being a 
plain instance of what legislatures may rightly consider a grave evil, 
speech foreseeably engendering a bare possibility of that consequence 
becomes at once punishable. Virtually all such speech save, perhaps, 
utterances one may make aloud in his bedroom with no one about is 
thus "UP" (unprotected). Only a harmless few are "P" (protected). In-
deed, given the gravity of this evil, it is likely that in many situations 
even a post hoc showing of zero likelihood of its occurring will not save 
it under the first amendment. For example, the prohibition would 
reach a speaker who solicited another to murder his spouse when, un-
known to the speaker, the solicitee was an undercover officer who ac-
knowledged that at no time did he consider acting on the inducement. 
One great (although little noted) advantage of the manner in 
which this particular graphic depiction addresses ''the freedom" of 
speech is its applicability to a number of incidental issues. These are 
issues conventionally treated separately in the case law of the first 
amendment, such as those of "reasonable time, place, and manner,"27 
and issues of so-called "indirect effects."28 In fact, the Learned Hand 
27. Compare Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (breach of peace convictions 
reversed in circumstances of large-scale and somewhat boisterous racial demonstration on state 
house grounds), with Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (criminal trespass convictions af-
firmed in circumstances of smaller, less boisterous racial demonstration on jail grounds); compare 
Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (breach of peace conviction reversed for silent, racial 
protest stand·in in public library unteroom), with Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972) 
(breach of peace conviction sustained for noisy demonstration within 100 feet of high school dur-
ing school day) ("The nature of a place, 'the pattern of its normal activities, dictates the kinds of 
regulations of time, place, and manner that are reasonable.' "). The most recent decision in this 
heavily case-congested subject is Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 
101 S. Ct. 2559 (1981). 
28. These are cases in which no speech is forbidden by law but where, for instance, being 
obliged to say something may under the circumstances indirectly inhibit one's ability or willing-
ness to speak candidly. See, e.g., Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (duty to 
publish a reply by any candidate for office disparaged by the newspaper, held invalid); Lamont v. 
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formulation is quite capable of resolving virtually all free speech adju-
dications, as a few additional examples may make clear. 
"Reasonable time, place, and manner'' restrictions do not forbid 
particular utterances (e.g., advocacy of trespass, incitement of arson or 
homicide, obscenity, or racial epithets) but merely restrict the time or 
the place of speech or regulate the manner of speaking.29 For example, 
a disorderly conduct law may not apply to one who shouts his message 
or even amplifies his speech over loudspeakers in an auditorium,30 but 
may apply to one who shouts his message on a street comer downtown 
or amplifies his speeeh over loudspeakers carried on a van through resi-
dential neighborhoods.31 The Hand formulation we have been exam-
ining is adequate in responding to this problem: merely isolate the evil 
alleged to arise from the time, place, or manner of speaking; determine 
initially whether it rests within the legislative prerogative to deem it an 
evil; identify its relative gravity at the proper point somewhere along 
the horizontal axis; and finally, ascertain in the particular case the 
probability that the particular time, place, or manner of the speech will 
in fact bring about that evil. Having thus located the degree of 
probability at some point on the vertical axis, it is easy enough as a 
figurative exercise to draw the proper lines to see whether they intersect 
in the protected zone or the unprotected zone of the rectangle. 
The same is true for controversies conventionally catalogued as 
instances of "indirect effects." Such a case arises when the regulation 
in question does not forbid or restrict speech, but demands that one 
speak under pain of punishment for failure to do so. But, paradoxi-
cally, it may still be obvious under the circumstances that "the free-
dom" of speech is threatened and a straightforward first amendment 
question presented.32 An example is a law that requires a journalist to 
Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (compelled indication of wanting to receive certain mail, as 
a condition of having such mail delivered, held invalid); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) 
(prohibition of anonymous handbills, held invalid). Frequently, although there is no prohibition 
upon what may be said, it is the "indirect effect" of a "reasonable time, place, and manner" 
restriction that effects the speech or press abridgment. See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 
(1978) (restriction on press access to jail of questionable condition upheld). 
29. See cases at note 27 supra. 
30. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (breach of peace conviction of speaker re-
versed where demagogic auditorium harangue attracted angry crowd outside). 
31. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) (disorderly conduct conviction for refusing 
police officer's request to cease street comer harangue attracting hostile crowd at busy intersection 
affirmed); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (misdemeanor conviction for "loud and raucous 
sounding truck" in business district upheld; dicta suggesting court would be favorable to similar 
restriction in residential areas). 
32. See cases and discussion at note 28 supra. See also Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1 (1971) 
(ineligibility for bar from refusal to disclose membership in certain organization reversed as un-
duly discouraging citizens "from exercising rights protected by the Constitution"); Gibson v. Flor-
ida Legis. Investig. Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963) (six-month jail term and $1,200 fine for contempt 
in refusing to identify names of NAACP members to state legislative committee reversed). 
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disclose in a civil or criminal proceeding the name of some person and 
the exact statements that person may have spoken to the journalist. 
The occasion for summoning the journalist, moreover, may typically be 
the occasion of the journalist's own speech, such as a news article that 
he or she has published. Because the journalist would not have been 
summoned but for having spoken through the news article, the sum-
mons is a plain cost levied by law on his or her speech. Because the 
anticipation of having to answer under such circumstances may also 
operate as a disincentive to publish like stories in the future, the law 
curtails (i.e., abridges) his or her continuing freedom to speak. And 
because the existence of this coercive process is a law inhibiting third 
parties from freely speaking to the journalist, it abridges their freedom 
of speech as well. Certainly, moreover, the journalist is an appropriate 
party to assert such contingent, third-party free speech objections. 
The summoning of the journalist is thus a case arising under the 
first amendment, but that conclusion does not determine whether the 
journalist may nevertheless be summoned and made to respond.33 The 
answer to that question is provided by Judge Hand's formulation: "In 
each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the evil, discounted 
by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is neces-
sary to avoid the danger."34 And, again, the same locational decisions, 
once made at appropriate points on the vertical and horizontal axes on 
our graphic, will unerringly permit us to draw the appropriate lines to 
see whether they intersect at a point that is protected or unprotected. 
How grave is the evil? In other words, what harm may ensue if the 
journalist is not made to answer? Is it that a murder may go unsolved, 
a libel plaintiff go uncompensated, a mere parking violation go unde-
tected, or the source of atomic secrets given over to an enemy nation go 
undetermined? How probable is it that, without the journalist being 
made to answer questions (which question in particular?), the evil will 
occur? That question, of course, may be divided into logical lesser 
questions. What reasons are there for believing the journalist may 
know a great deal about the matter? What alternative means may be 
available (and at what cost) to secure that information without the 
journalist's assistance? Each question is necessary to determine 
whether summoning the journalist and making him answer is "neces-
sary to avoid the danger." If the evil is very great (the atomic secrets 
case?), even a minuscule chance that the journalist's compelled testi-
mony might help may be sufficient. 
33. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (rejection of blanket refusal by jour-
nalist to appear before grand jury investigating possible crimes reported by the journalist in news-
paper with information allegedly derived from confidential sources). 
34. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951). 
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But we have said enough, for the point is not to resolve every hy-
pothetical. It is, rather, to demonstrate the compelling capacity of the 
Hand formulation to answer an immense number of first amendment 
disputes. It is, in brief, a very powerful formula for resolving "the free-
dom" of speech, and is used more frequently than is generally acknowl-
edged because its approach figures in time, place, and manner cases 
and in indirect effects cases as well. 
v 
THE CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER THRESHHOLD 
There are nonetheless objectionable features to the Learned Hand 
formulation quite apart from the quintessential difficulty that it, too, 
compels even conscientious courts to look outside the first amendment 
to resolve such imponderables as what evils shall be deemed of more-
or-less gravity than others in measuring the scope of "the freedom" of 
speech. For example, when the evil to be avoided is serious, then, as 
shown on the graphic, the test virtually dispenses with any probability 
requirement as a precondition of punishing or of preventing speech. 
Thus, a large (and uncertain) category of speech cases is treated not 
significantly differently than in the second graphic in which perjury, 
criminal solicitation, and obscenity were treated as kinds of speech per 
se not within "the" freedom of speech. While that apparent conform-
ance is exceedingly helpful and comforting in one respect (f. e., it recon-
ciles those cases), in another respect it poses a severe problem. 
According to that earlier graphic, "political" speech was not 
among the outcast kinds of speech. To the contrary, it was altogether 
within the 100% protected field. But the Hand approach precludes this 
easy (and protective?) definitional address to the first amendment. For 
the question according to the Hand test is not simply whether the 
speech in question involved politics or government in some generic, 
loose sense; rather, the focus is not on the speech at all, it is on the 
alleged evil to be avoided by outlawing the speech. 
The Dennis case is itself an example of the resulting problem. Eu-
gene Dennis was prosecuted under the Smith Act35 for "conspiring" to 
"organize" a group (the American Communist Party) whose purposes 
included teaching the doctrine of the propriety of force and violence as 
a means to "overthrow" the government of the United States. Since the 
deaths of any number of persons ranks as a very grave evil, and since 
Congress has the right to seek to prevent that grave evil, suppression of 
speech under the formula is permitted by the first amendment on the 
most meager probability that, unless suppressed, the speech might 
35. 18 u.s.c. § 2385 (1976). 
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bring about that evil.36 For all practical purposes, then, the case is 
treated not much differently from one in which X offers Y $5,000 to 
murder his spouse. X may be punished although Y was never inclined 
to accept the offer and, indeed, was an undercover agent. The gravity 
of the evil (of spousal murder) dispenses with the need to show any 
probability that the danger can be headed off only by punishing the 
offer. 
In the murder solicitation case, doubtless we are untroubled by the 
outcome. (But doubtless, too, because we entertain doubts as to 
whether (a) such speech was ever imagined to come within the first 
amendment and, that question aside, (b) why ~yone in his right mind 
would want to have such speech protected by the first amendment.) In 
the .Dennis case, however, many are troubled. It is not obvious that 
advocating overthrow of the government contributes nothing useful. 
Neither is it obvious that advocacy of violent overthrow, and not 
merely of voting to change the form of government, was never imagi-
nably within the first amendment. Rather, so long as there is no dis-
cernible prospect of serious harm actually occurring, the freedom to 
state grievances passionately and angrily, protesting not merely the ex-
isting government but expressing a desperate feeling that nothing but 
violence exists to modify that government, may be important speech. It 
raises the unspoken questions. It makes visible a despair that needs to 
be known. It demands answers from others that more genteel sugges-
tions and less threatening discourse may fail to stimulate.37 It provokes 
to be sure. But the .Dennis formulation ignores these central first 
amendment values because it permits such utterances to be treated like 
furtively made offers to hire a murder. It encourages and sustains their 
suppression virtually without evidence of any actual or imminent dan-
ger. The dissenting opinions in the .Dennis case made effective use of 
this point,38 and the history of prosecutions in the United States bears 
36. The point is vigorously emphasized in the Douglas dissent in IJennis, 341 U.S. at 582, 
584 ("So far as the present record is concerned, what petitioners did was to organize people to 
teach and themselves teach the Marxist-Leninist doctrine contained chiefly in four books .... 
Not a single seditious act is charged in the indictment. To make a lawful speech unlawful because 
two men conceive it is to raise the law of conspiracy to appalling proportions."). 
37. The point was well made by Justice Douglas in Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4: "[A) function 
of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its 
high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they 
are, or even stirs people to anger." That provocative, offensive, or gratuitous language, attention-
getting by its willful offensiveness, may for that reason be highly protected as well, is elegantly 
defended in Justice Harlan's majority opinion in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). No 
doubt the classic exposition of this view in the case law is in Justice Holmes' dissent in Abrams v. 
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919). Exquisite reiterations appear in his dissenting opinion in 
Gitlow v. New York, 368 U.S. 652, 672 (1925), and the Brandeis concurring opinion in Whitney v. 
California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927). , 
38. 341 U.S. at 579, 581. See note 36 supra. The shortcomings of ])ennis in this regard are 
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out the complaint. 39 
A formulation to cope with this complaint would set a minimum 
probability below which the alleged danger feared from this kind of 
speech would never be sufficient to justify punishing the speech. It 
might, for instance, look like this: 
Probability 
of 
Event 
("Clear and.....,)oi-·--·--
Present") 
Protected Speech 
.:::{: .... 
: . ··:.:;;;:i:· 
0% ~--------------------------~ 
0 Gravity of Evil 100 
Under this view, although violence itself may be passionately advo-
cated, when the feared danger lacks clarity and imminence, such 
speech remains within the latitude of speech that defines "the freedom" 
of speech.40 And this, of course, is the earlier, substantially more pro-
further explored in J. ELY, supra note 9, at 107-08; M. SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE 
SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 63-65 (1966); Strong, F!fly Years of "Clear and Present 
])anger':· From Schenck to Brandenburg-and Beyond, 1969 SuP. CT. Rev. 41, 52-53. The ])en-
nis formulation is nonetheless defended. See, e.g., Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amend-
ment Problems, 47 IND. LJ. 1, 32-35 (1971). 
39. See cases and materials cited in notes 5-8 supra. 
40. John Stuart Mill's powerful essay, On Liberty, contains an extraordinarily resolute antic-
ipation of the clear and present danger test in the concrete example of "tyrannicide," a topic that 
in contemporary terms might embrace advocating the desirability of presidential assassination. 
Note the anticipation oflater defenses as to why advocacy of illegal (and clearly dangerous) action 
is deemed defensible: 
If the arguments of the present chapter are of any validity, there ought to exist the fullest 
liberty of professing and discussing, as a matter of ethical conviction, any doctrine, how-
ever immoral it may be considered. It would, therefore, be irrelevant and out of place to 
examine here, whether the doctrine of Tyrannicide deserves that title. I shall content 
myself with saying that the subject has been at all times one of the open questions of 
morals; that the act of a private citizen in striking down a criminal, who, by raising 
himself above the law, has placed himself beyond the reach of legal punishment or con-
trol, has been accounted by whole nations, and by some of the best and wisest of men, 
not a crime, but an act of exalted virtue; and that, right or wrong, it is not of the nature of 
assassination, but of civil war. As such, I hold that the instigation of it, in a spec!fic case, 
may be a proper subject of punishment, but only (fan overt act has followed, and at/east a 
probable connection can be established between the act and the instigation. 
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tective formula proposed by Mr. Justice Holmes in 1919, in Schenck v. 
United States: "The question in every case is whether the words used 
are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a 
clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils 
that Congress has a right to prevent."4 I In a slightly different iteration, 
it is the formula reasserted quite unanimously by the Court in 1969, in 
Brandenburg v. Ohio: "[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech 
and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of 
the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is di-
rected to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to 
incite or produce such action."42 
There is, moreover, an addition to this formulation that may help 
to alleviate a different kind of problem unresolved in the graphic de-
picting the Learned Hand formulation. Under that formulation, the 
"gravity" of an evil is traded off against its improbability in measuring 
the scope of "the freedom" of speech. Speech calculated (or likely) to 
J.S. MILL, On Liberty, in UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY, & REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 78 n.l 
(1910) (emphasis added). 
41. 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (emphasis added). 
42. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). The equivalent to the requirement that the danger must be 
"clear and present" is that the lawless action must be "imminent ... and ... likely." The Bran-
denburg formulation is additionally rigorous in its scienter requirement, i.e., that the advocacy 
must be "directed to" produce the lawless action (the "evil"). The formulation thus protects the 
speaker to the extent that it forbids making the speaker an insurer of his audience; it holds him 
criminally respousible only insofar as he meant to produce the imminent lawless action likely-in-
fact to be produced by his utterances. In this respect, then, it borrows the advantage of Learned 
Hand's original formulation in Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), and com-
bines it with the advantage of the Holmes formulation. See Gunther, supra note 2, at 754-55. The 
intent requirement mitigates a problem in the clear and present danger test well illustrated in the 
following example by Justice Rutledge: 
It is axiomatic that a democratic state may not deny its citizens the right to criticize 
existing laws and to urge that they be changed. And yet, in order to succeed in an effort 
to legalize polygamy it is obviously necessary to convince a substantial number of people 
that such conduct is desirable. But conviction that the practice is desirable has a natural 
tendency to induce the practice itself. Thus, depending on where the circular reasoning 
is started, the advocacy of polygamy may either be unlawful as inducing a violation of 
law, or be constitutionally protected as essential to the proper functioning of the demo-
cratic process. 
Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95, 101-02 (1948) (dissenting opinion). In the origina_l clear and present 
danger formulation, intent was an alternative standard. Thus, in his Abrams dissent, Justice 
Holmes had declared: "It is only the present danger of immediate evil or an intent to bring it 
about that warrants Congress in setting a limit to the expression of opinion where private rights 
are not concerned." Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (emphasis added}. Cur-
rently, even when merely "private rights" such as reputation are concerned, some degree of scien-
ter (at least negligence) must be established to provide recovery of money damages. The 
foundation case on this point is unquestionably New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 
(1964). See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). The first amendment need for some 
kind of scienter requirement to avoid the self-censoring consequences of a strict liability standard, 
is self-evident 
For an excellent general review of the Brandenburg standard, see Comment, Brandenburg v. 
Ohio: A Speech Test for All Seasons, 43. U. CHI. L. REV. 151 (1975). 
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produce relatively trivial evils (e.g., trespass on privately owned, vacant 
lots) would, as we saw, be punishable only in the rare circumstance 
where it induced such trespasses or, at least, was virtually certain to do 
so. Left undetermined by the formula, however, was the extent to 
which a legislature might add to the legal categories of things deemed 
evil and, by doing so, provide a sufficient predicate for outlawing or 
punishing additional forms of speech. 
For instance, may not a legislature, acting responsibly within its 
police power, describe as an evil the infliction of pain and suffering on 
others? May it not specify mental anguish as one such kind of pain? 
May it not provide redress (criminal and/ or civil) against those in-
flicting mental anguish on others? If so, then much speech not hitherto 
abridged may now be abridged: the speech newly forbidden must 
merely make the occurrence of the evil highly probable-or cause the 
evil to occur.43 Frequently, the substantive evil to be avoided (mental 
anguish) will be not only a clear and present danger under the circum-
stances, to use Holmes' original formulation; rather it will be a fact. 
Q.E..D. , the speech bringing it about can be redressed both in civil and 
in criminal law. 
Even the addition of "clear and present danger" to the formulation 
thus leaves the graphic dramatically incomplete. There remains virtu-
ally unlimited elbowroom for legislatures to do in two steps what they 
might not do in one. If a given kind of detested speech does not gener-
ate a constitutionally sufficient danger of one kind of evil to rationalize 
its abridgment, the legislature may simply describe as an evil some-
thing the detested kind of speech is likely to bring about. The speech 
may then, constitutionally, be abridged. For instance, the street comer 
distribution of Communist handbills may be too remote from any like-
lihood of inducing violence against the government to suppress on that 
account. But their distribution under the circumstances is nonetheless 
very likely to produce litter. Litter in the public streets is assuredly 
something a legislature may deem an evil. A flat prohibition of any 
43. In Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), the Supreme Court upheld 
the right of public school students to wear black (protest) armbands on campus, despite the claim 
that the other children would regard the armbands as provocative and that the armbands might 
cause some degree of mental anguish to students whose fathers had died fighting in Vietnam. The 
Illinois Supreme Court adhered quite faithfully to that decision in refusing to sustain a municipal 
ban on armbands iiivoived in the Nazi march, Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of 
America, 69 Ill. 2d 605, 373 N.E.2d 21 (1978), and was severely criticized for not sustaining the 
restriction on a "fighting words" and "avoidance of mental suffering" rationale. See, e.g., 
Horowitz & Bramson, Skokie, the ACLU and the Endurance of .Democratic Theory, L. & CoN-
TEMP. PROB., Spring, 1979, at 328; Rabinowitz, Nazis in Skokie: Fighting Words or Heckler's 
Veto?, 28 DE PAULL. REv. 259 (1979). For a related discussion, see Comment, The Fighting 
Words .Doctrine-Is there a Clear and Present .Danger to the Standard?, 84 DICK. L. REv. 75 
(1979). 
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handbill distribution may, under the circumstances, be necessary to 
avoid the danger of that litter. The result would be no more handbills, 
Communist or otherwise. 
The Holmes formulation, in its original terms, plainly embraces 
this outcome since it requires no determination of the gravity of the 
evil. It is not quite clear whether the Hand formulation does so. It 
leaves open the possibility that although a complete prohibition of 
handbills may be necessary to avoid the danger, the gravity of that evil 
still may be constitutionally insufficient to 'justify such invasion of free 
speech." In brief, is regulation of some evils (e.g., aesthetic blight, 
mental anguish) otherwise within the capacity of legislatures to avoid 
nonetheless prohibited when it curtails freedom of speech? In a later 
and stronger formulation of the Holmes' test, the answer was emphatic: 
yes. The first amendment forbids sanctions against speech except as 
necessary to avoid "serious" evils. The appropriate graphic looks like 
this: 
100% r--------r--~------.. 
Probability 
of 
Event 
Protected Unprotected Speech 
("Clear and_, ------·--·--·+---------4 Present") 
Protected Protected 
0% ~----~-------~ 
0 ("Serious") Gravity of Evil 100 
Thus, Mr. Justice Brandeis suggested in I927: "Prohibition of free 
speech and assembly is a measure so stringent that it would be inappro-
priate as the means for averting a relatively trivial harm to society."44 
It followed that a certain degree of litter, unwelcome noise, mental per-
turbation, violated anonymity, and degraded reputation are withdrawn 
from the general police power to protect against that latitude of free 
speech contemplated by "the freedom" of speech.45 
44. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927). 
45. Thus, Justice Brandeis used the example of advocacy of a moral right or duty "to cross 
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At its zenith, the developed Holmes-Brandeis depiction may be the 
most sheltering perspective of the first amendment we have had. Its 
formulation is as readily applicable to "time, place, and manner" 
abridgments and to "indirect effects" abridgments as to direct abridg-
ments. In this respect, it is as complete as the .Dennis formulation. Al-
though it demands the judiciary make a determination for which the 
first amendment itself supplies no textual assistance (namely, what ex-
ternal and immutable points of reference determine those things legis-
latures may declare to be serious evils and those they may not so 
describe),46 it is no worse than .Dennis in this respect. And, applied 
unenclosed, unposted, waste land" as an example of an instance when such advocacy could not be 
punished-even when directed to the urging of such trespass, "even if there was imminent danger 
that advocacy would lead to a trespass,'' and even assuming that the trespassers, acting on the 
advocacy, could themselves be punished. /d. at 377-79 ("[T]he evil apprehended [must be] rela-
tively serious .... There must be the probability of serious injury to the states. . . . (T]he evil 
apprehended [must be] so substantial as to justify the stringent restriction interposed by the legis-
lature."). This rule was applied in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972) ("The 
right to use a public place for expressive activity may be restricted only for weighty reasons."); 
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (reversing breach of peace conviction for exhibitingjacket 
with "Fuck the Draft" in a courthouse corridor before women and children, holding that the 
privacy interests of the unwilling and offended persons from distasteful vulgarities in such a place 
were insufficiently "substantial"); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) ("(F]reedom of 
speech, though not absolute, ... is nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment, un-
less shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far 
above public inconvenience [or] annoyance .... "); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 
(1941) ("[T]he substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely 
high before utterances can be punished."); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939) (public 
interest in clean streets insufficient to justify antiliandbilling ordinance). See also Time, Inc. v. 
Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (family who had declined to sell rights in their story involving intrusion 
by escaping felons into their home, who plainly wanted no attention, and who were placed in a 
false (but not unflattering) light by a Life Magazine story, recovered money damages under New 
York privacy statutes but were reversed in the Supreme Court). See the excellent discussion of 
these issues in Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 L. & CoN· 
TEMP. PROB. 326 (1966); Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum, 1965 SUP. CT. REv. 1. 
There, is incidentally, a tendency to say that a statute directly abridging speech must serve a 
"compelling state interest," rather than that it must be necessary to avoid a "serious" evil. See, 
eg., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 602 (1978). In certain respects, this different 
figure of speech seems to be just as good, retaining as it does the notion that something more than 
interests suitable to sustain the police power in general must clearly be forthcoming in first amend-
ment cases. Because of the facile use of this phrase ("compelling state interest") in connection 
with other clauses in the Constitution (e.g., the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend· 
ment), however, we may come to regret the tendency to use it in connection with the free speech 
clause. Other clauses are not as emphatic as the first amendment, a difference that sets this clause 
apart. If (as seems desirable) one wants to retain a special stringency for the first amendment, it 
may be vital to avoid linguistic usages that tend to blur or merge its treatment with cases, doc-
trines, and standards drawn from less robust sections in the Constitution. 
46. An excellent example is raised by the facts of Missouri v. National Org. for Women, Inc., 
620 F.2d 1301 (1980), cer/. denied, 101 U.S. 122 (1981). The NOW campaign for convention 
boycotts of states that had not ratified the equal rights amendment was found to be protected by 
the first amendment right to petition the government and was not an illegal restraint of trade or 
intentional infliction of economic harm. Since the NOW boycott was causing revenue losses by 
Missouri motel and restaurant owners as part ofits efforts to influence the votes of state legislators, 
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with any degree of tough-minded consistency, it creates a considerably 
larger field of speech within "the freedom" of speech than the .Dennis 
the issue was whether the government can forbid such economic "persuasion." It is factually 
correct to characterize such efforts as a "conspiracy" to induce a "secondary boycott" that has as 
its objective the coercion of third parties to express support for legislative changes they do not in 
fact desire. It is also factually correct to characterize such efforts as the peaceful communication 
of truthful information enabling each citizen to decide according to his own conscience whether, 
in these circumstances, he or she wishes to take the information into account and, indeed, in what 
way to take it into account. 
The Supreme Court has suggested that even high-powered private propaganda, aimed at the 
body politic to persuade the public to influence Congress to adopt laws destructive to competition 
and of selfish economic advantage to the group mounting that campaign, is fully protected by the 
first amendment. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). 
See also First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). The Court has also made clear, how-
ever, that government itself rna; not exert duress on private parties to compel insincere expression 
of political support. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). See also Branti v. Finkel, 100 S. Ct. 1287 (1980); Elrod v. Burns, 
427 U.S. 347 (1970). But none of these cases is especially instructive. 
A bit closer to the point, the Court has sustained state laws that would restrict the dissemina-
tion of even truthful information when done for the purpose of stimulating an economic boycott 
to induce a business practice that would itself violate a valid law, Giboney v. Empire Storage & 
Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949), but that issue is plainly not involved in this problem, since an insin-
cere expression of enthusiasm for the equal rights amendment by Missouri businessmen would 
violate no law. In dicta, the Court has also suggested that circulating information to induce a 
boycott to force a change in the targeted business' own business practice may not be constitution-
ally prohibitable, despite the boycott's coercive effect. See Organization for a Better Austin v. 
Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) ("The claim that the expressions were intended to exercise a 
coercive impact on respondent does not remove them from the reach of the First Amendment."). 
But this, too, is inconclusive. 
Indeed, the critical question has been avoided by judicial hesitancy to find any existing law 
addressed squarely to the crucial issue. A fair test would snppose a statute framed in the following 
way: 
It shall be unlawful for any person or combination of persons to coerce or attempt to 
coerce any other person in respect to their vote in any election or the manner in which 
they choose to exercise their freedom to speak or not to speak on any political issue or 
candidate, including within this prohibition the truthful communication to third parties 
of information imparted for the purpose and with the effect of inducing a boycott of the 
person whose vote or expression of political belief is meant thereby to be coerced, except 
insofar as that person holds public office or is a candidate for public office. 
Doubtless, speech may be used to coerce legislators to vote for propositions despite their views 
respecting the merits, under the duress of being boycotted. Whether, consistent with the first 
amendment, private citizens may also be coerced by economic pressure, however, has not yet been 
determined. 
In Osborn v. Pennsylvania-Delaware Serv. Station Dealers Ass'n, 499 F. Supp. 553 (D. Del. 
1980), a motion to dismiss a private (consumer) antitrust action was denied in an opinion disap-
proving the court of appeals' _ _r~a_soning in the NOW case and holding that boycotts instituted to 
induce consumers to exert political pressure on government are neither exempt from the Sherman 
Act nor protected by the first amendment. I d. at 558 n.8. For a discussion (and reference to cases) 
related to this fascinating problem, see Hersbergen, Picketing by Aggrieved Consumers-A Case 
Law Analysis, 59 IOWA L. REv. 1097 (1974); Note, NOW or Never: Is There Antitrust Liabt1ityfor 
Noncommercial Boycotts?, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1317 (1980); Note, Concerted Refusals to .Deal by 
Non-Business Groups: A Critique of Missouri v. NOW, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 143 (1980); Note, 
Political Boycott Activity and the First Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 659 (1978); Note, First 
Amendment Analysis of Peace.fol Picketing, 28 ME. L. REV. 203 (1976); Note, Protest Boycotts 
Under the Sherman Act, 128 U. PA. L. REV. II31 (1980). 
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formulation, because it demands that a clear and present danger be 
shown in each case, rather than yielding to speculations of mere calam-
itous possibility as sufficient to sustain speech abridgments. Moreover, 
in the face of the irresistible counterexample we confronted at the out-
set of these graphics, we evidently can propose no test for "the free-
dom" of speech that is free of the criticism that, at bottom, 
administration even of this test remains subject to a discouraging 
amount of judicial subjectivism. 
VI 
RECOMBINANT GRAPHICS 
The conundrum of the irresistible counterexample is a difficult 
one, as we have seen. In fact, it is so powerful a device that it mocks 
virtually every effort, including the Holmes-Brandeis graphic, to render 
the first amendment foolproof against the risks of .discretionary inter-
pretation. That graphic demands that in every case there be a showing 
of an actual, clear, and present danger that a serious evil imminently 
lurks in an utterance punishable by law. That must mean, however, 
that speech falling literally on deaf ears is never punishable. A villain 
sadistically, knowingly, and falsely shouting "Fire!" in a crowded thea-
ter escapes under cover of the first amendment if, perchance, the thea-
ter is crowded only by deaf persons reading subtitles on the screen. An 
offer of bribery to an honest official who testifies it never entered his 
mind to accept (and who, rather, at once reported the offer to the po-
lice) is not punishable, nor is the act of the lucky person who unwit-
tingly solicits an undercover agent to murder his spouse, rather than a 
gun-for-hire. No successful prosecution for criminal attempt in any of 
these cases? That must logically follow unless we cope with the 
counterexample by pretending that these are not instances of speech at 
all but, rather, "conduct," "speech-brigaded-with-action," or some 
other mendacious technique, or unless we admit to the nonexclusivity 
of the developed Holmes formulation. 
As it happens, the case law does in fact hedge47--even as Holmes 
tended to do.48 By combining two graphics we have already set forth, 
moreover, we can see how the problem might be met straightforwardly: 
47. See notes 19-22 and accompanying text supra. 
48. See quotations and references at notes 17 & 42 supra. 
1982] 
100% 
Probability 
of 
Event 
("Clear and 
Present") 
0% 
0 
FREE SPEECH CLAUSE 
("Serious") G 
"t fEvil 100 ravt yo 
Protected Unprotected 
I 
I 
I 
Protected I Protected I 
I 
I 
I 
I 100% 
Unprotected {Kinds oj) Speech 
137 
Perjury 
Criminal 
Solicitation 
Commercial 
Speech(?) 
Fighting 
Words(?) 
Libel(?) 
The description is a composite of the second graphic (certain kinds of 
speech are wholly unprotected), plus the developed Holmes-Brandeis 
graphic. It handles our problem, it has an administrable logic, and it 
fits the syntax of the first amendment. The language of ''the freedom" 
of speech that Congress may make no law abridging, in this view, may 
be a qualifying phrase that communicates two considerations rather 
than a single distinction. It may mean both a delimitation of kinds of 
speech entitled to that latitude of speech constituting ''the freedom" of 
speech and a certain latitude or scope of speech as reported in the Den-
nis formulation or as in the Holmes-Brandeis formulation.49 As a 
highly plausible matter, moreover, such an understanding of the first 
amendment is surely not unimaginable. 
We have thus far had little to do with history in this Article, 50 
49. A very timely example is provided by the Supreme Court's most recent commercial 
speech case, Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 101 S. Ct. 2882 (1981). The plurality opinion 
bifurcates commercial speech, declaring that some is not protected at all by the first amendment 
and that the protected speech is subject to restriction if (but only if) three conditions are met: 
We [have] adopted a four-part test for determining the validity of government re-
strictions ou commercial speech as distinguished from more fully protected speech. 
(1) The First Amendment protects commercial speech only if that speech concerns law-
ful activity and is not misleading. A restriction on otherwise protected commercial 
speech is valid only if it (2) seeks to implement a substantial governmental interest, 
(3) directly advances that interest, and (4) reaches no farther than necessary to accom-
plish the given objective. 
Id at 2892 (emphasis added). 
50. But see notes 2, 5-8 supra. See a/so E. HUDON, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN 
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partly to try to escape the obvious criticism that any such reference 
tends to invite. Once history is admitted to be the guide, or even a 
guide, to interpreting or understanding some clause in the Constitution, 
we are in despair for the Constitution itself. It was partly to get free of 
such disputes that all these other approaches were offered.5 I Reintro-
ducing history even as a means to select among nonhistory graphics for 
depicting the first amendment seems a certain recipe for irony, if not 
for disaster. 
But perhaps no such fullblooded reference to any detailed or dog-
matic history of the first amendment is required here. Rather, perhaps 
all that is needed is the modest notion of historical reasonableness: that 
this last graphic we have set out is historically plausible. Good reasons 
can be offered to show why certain kinds of speech (e.g., offers of brib-
ery) might plainly have been in no one's mind as within ''the freedom 
of speech" that Congress was forbidden to abridge, 52 and why it might 
be true also that speech well within ''the freedom of speech" might 
sometimes, in some circumstances, also be subject to congressional 
regulation. 53 
Although this last graphic deals handily with the irresistible 
counterexample and might not be historically implausible, it is still as-
suredly subject to severe hazards of judicial discretion and judicial mis-
application. Courts will catalogue some kinds of speech as never 
within the freedom of speech (e.g. , obscenity), thereby letting the out-
come of cases tum on fatally different definitions of "obscene."54 As to 
speech that survives that preliminary process of definitional win-
nowing, courts will also presume to catalogue degrees of evil or harms, 
at least to determine whether the harm sought to be avoided is too triv-
ial to tolerate an abridgment of protected speech even when the speech 
produces that trivial evil. And, obviously, courts must superintend the 
AMERICA (1963); F. SIEBERT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN ENGLAND 1476-1776 (1952); sources 
cited in Rabban, supra note 2, at 560 nn.236-41. 
5 I. See note 18 supra for an example of the vigor and confidence with which mutually exclu-
sive views have been put forth respecting the ratification of the first amendment as a repudiation, 
or as an absorption, of the common law of seditious libel. 
52. See notes 17 & 19 supra. 
53. This sort of dichotomy within the speech clause has been defended on purely prudential 
grounds. Thus, Professor Tribe suggests: 
In retrospect, the two-level theory may well have served a vital purpose in protecting first 
amendment doctrine from general erosion by walling out entirely those categories of 
expression that the Court was unready to protect but could not hold punishable as clear 
and present dangers without diluting the meaning of that phrase. 
L. TRIBE, supra note 45, at 671. 
54. The following observation is, alas, not a parody of the case law of the last 20 years, but a 
concise summary of it: "[T]he Court ha[s] moved from a view in which the obscene was unpro-
tected because utterly worthless (Roth), to an approach in which the obscene was unprotected !f 
utterly worthless (Memoirs), to a conclusion in which obscenity was unprotected even if not "ut-
terly'' without worth (Miller)." Id at 661. 
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adequacy of legislative factfindings and of jury adjudicative fact deter-
mination to say whether a serious evil was sufficiently clear and immi-
nent under the circumstances to sustain the punishment of (protected) 
speech. 
VII 
CORRELATING PROTECTION TO KINDS OF SPEECH 
Despite their evident difficulties, the last several graphics do tend 
to sum up the principal contending schools of first amendment inter-
pretation during the past several decades. At the same time, there has 
gradually developed still another view that does not, as did these 
graphics, make quite so much depend upon which side of one-or-more 
fixed lines a given kind of case falls. To be sure, this view also does not 
escape problems of judicial discretion. But by introducing finer grada-
tions of a particular sort, it may appear both more moderate and less 
rigid in the measuring of protected speech. Interestingly, it comple-
ments the graphic we examined in the Dennis case. 
Dennis defined the principal task of the courts as graduating the 
kinds and degrees of evil to be balanced against the improbability of 
their occurrence resulting from particular speech to determine whether 
the degree of abridgment was unavoidable and therefore permissible. 
Correspondingly, an increasingly fashionable view holds that it is im-
portant to graduate the kind of speech to be invaded. 55 If it is political 
speech (e.g. , rhetoric praising or abusing candidates for office, or rheto-
ric exaggerating the alleged effects, provisions, merits, or demerits of 
existing laws), the speech is deemed of such central importance to the 
functions of the first amendment that even the high probability of a 
reprehensible evil (e.g. , that a far more honest and intelligent candidate 
will lose to a dishonest, manipulative, selfish demagogue) will not jus-
tify any recourse against the wretched slanders of the victor. If it is 
commercial speech, on the other hand, the evil of consumer deception 
may be avoided on a lesser probability of fraud than in the political 
speech case, although commercial speech will not, on that account 
alone, be treated as 100% unprotected,56 as is obscenity or solicitation 
55. Probably the leading example is the differentiated first amendment standards that must 
be met as a prerequisite for recovering damages for libel, e.g., whether the plaintiff is a political 
official (or at least a "public figure") or a private figure uninvolved in government. See Time, Inc. 
v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). For general discussions ranking speech protection 
according to its bearing upon government and social change, see A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH 
AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948); Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment 
Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUNDATION REsEARCH J. 521; Kalven, The New York Times Case.· A Note 
on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 SuP. CT. REv. 191. 
56. As previously noted (note 49 supra), the Court currently takes the view that some com-
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of homicide. Graphic_s carrying these additional views of first amend-
ment priority may look like either of the following: 
Protection of the First Amendment By Subject 
mercia! speech is wholly unprotected while that which is protected nonetheless is subject to restric· 
tion on grounds less demanding than if noncommercial ideological communication were involved. 
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 101 S. Ct. 2882, 2890 nn.ll & 12 (1981). For a recent 
helpful review and analysis on the subject, see Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment 
17reory, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 372 {1979). 
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These are unquestionably useful and interesting variations, 57 and 
even our attempt to present them graphically is not quite adequate be-
cause it tends to understate their subtlety. The graphics imply a neat, 
concentric order of speech values, relating the proximity of speech cate-
gories to core values of political self-determination, with commensurate 
first amendment protection contingent upon the distance of an identifi-
able kind of speech from that first amendment center. Quite obviously, 
however, a particular speech may in fact cut across these artificial lines, 
readily embarrassing an attempt to say which l9nd of speech it was. 
The libelous may well be related to the political utterance, the aesthetic 
may be quite inseparable from the allegedly obscene. And in many 
instances, a criminal conviction based on a statute that aims carefully 
57. The new feature emphasized in these last graphics may readily be incorporated into a 
composite statement that also integrates a great deal taken from several others. Such an inte-
grated statement might read as follows: ''The question in each case is whether the circumstances 
were sufficiently compelling to justify the degree of infringement resulting from the law, given the 
relationship of the speech abridged to the presuppositions of the first amendment." The last part 
of the formulation ("given the relationship of the speech abridged to the presuppositions of the 
first amendment") takes into account an implied, first amendment rank-ordering of speech. In 
tum, "whether the circumstances were sufficiently compelling to justify the degree of infringement 
resulting from the law" provides an accommodation for the Holmes-Brandeis standard. It encom-
passes cases where the speech is highly protected (and thus may not be abridged save on a show-
ing of clear and present danger of a serious evil), while nonetheless accommodating a lesser 
standard when the speech is itself far removed from politics and policy (e.g., misleading consumer 
solicitations redressable in private actions for fraud or restitution). Useful as well is the "degree of 
infringement resulting from the law," insofar as it may accommodate differences ranging from 
complete criminalization of certain utterances, through lesser incursions resulting from limited 
time, place, or manner controls, or limited civil liability to specifically damaged individuals. 
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only at the less protected aspect of a given speech (theoretically leaving 
unaffected the speaker's prerogative to make his political or aesthetic 
point in a different way) should not be sustainable, because often we 
will know that the same point expressed differently would in fact not be 
the same point at all. In public places, for instance, many will be of-
fended by the studied vulgarity of crude expressions made in exception 
to some important public policy. Still, neither more moderate nor 
more intellectual discourse may say the same thing, even half as well, 
as the bluntness of declaring: FUCK THE DRAFT. 58 
In effect, then, these graphics illuminate an additional perspective, 
but they do not reduce the margins of uncertainty, instability, external 
reference, and elbowroom for judicial administration in the regime of 
the first amendment. Perhaps, moreover, the point illustrated by these 
variations is that there is no sure formula for reading the first amend-
ment in any way that (a) copes with the irresistible counterexample, 
(b) fits with its syntax, and (c) enjoys even a plausible congruence with 
history, to make it foolproof. Which among these graphics seems bet-
ter (or merely less poor) than the rest is assuredly debatable. 
VIII 
STANDARDS FOR STATE LAWS VS. FEDERAL LAWS 
All along, we have nominally been examining the first amendment 
alone. In the first graphic depiction that treated "All Acts of Con-
gress," we were faithful to that task. In the very first irresistible 
counterexample of the deliberate false shout of "Fire!" in a crowded 
theater, however, we tacitly abandoned it. From that point on, the ex-
amples and counterexamples were indiscriminately state or federal. In-
deed, most of them (e.g. , an antilitter ordinance) would in fact be 
typically state or local. Outside the District of Columbia or the territo-
ries of the United States, few would be federal. Congress should have 
little occasion, and very little power, to adopt run-of-the-mill police 
power laws. And it may be significant that, numerically, the most tell-
ing irresistible counterexamples are predominantly just run-of-the-mill 
police power counterexamples. Soliciting the murder of one's spouse, 
for instance, is what state governments are designed to discourage. It 
was not a concern for this kind of problem-or obscenity or libel-that 
caused a new constitutional convention to be called for Philadelphia in 
1787 to amend the Articles of Confederation and to enlarge the enu-
merated powers of the Continental Congress. 
Our graphics have thus been askew. They have worked exclu-
sively from the text of the first amendment, yet they have propounded 
58. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
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analyses indiscriminately inclusive of laws not arising under the first 
amendment but of state and local origin. But the constitutional direc-
tive restricting state legislative power in respect to free speech is not on 
its face even remotely like the first amendment. Indeed, on its face, it 
acknowledges nothing special in respect to free speech at all. Rather, 
the protection of free speech is, at best, just textually subsumed in more 
general words: as an example of a "privilege or immunity'' of national 
citizenship; as an example of ''liberty''; as a subject of legal protection 
not to be denied "equal protection." In brief, we have indiscriminately 
mingled examples that typically will not all arise under the first amend-
ment, but will more often arise, rather, under a later amendment, the 
fourteenth, which declares: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of 
law; nor deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws.59 
Since 1925, it has been assumed nonetheless that the fourteenth 
amendment pulls up the first amendment's speech clause into its own 
provisions. 60 Indeed, it has been held not merely that freedom of 
speech is incorporated (or selectively absorbed) into the fourteenth 
amendment, but that the standard of judicial review for state or local 
laws affecting speech is coextensive with the standard applicable to acts 
of Congress. The result is that Supreme Court cases adjudicating state 
or local laws are fungible with those adjudicating acts of Congress; 
each is as valid a source of precedent for the other as it is valid for a 
case of its own kind. 
There was, however, nothing inevitable in this development. The 
very different texts of the first and the fourteenth amendments do not 
demand this result. Mr. Justice Brandeis expressed serious misgivings 
in an early case presuming to wed the first and fourteenth amendments 
in this regard.61 In an extremely provocative opinion, Mr. Justice 
Harlan did likewise, just thirty years later, suggesting a different lati-
59. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (1868). 
60. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (dictum). Stromberg v. California, 283 
U.S. 359 (1931), and Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927), reversed state convictions on free 
speech related grounds. Finally in 1931, the Supreme Court for the first time held a state statute 
invalid under the fourteenth amendment as violative of first amendment free speech standards. 
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), reviewed in F. FRIENDLY, MINNESOTA RAo (1981). Not 
until 1965 was an act of Congress actually held invalid under the free speech clause of the first 
amendment. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965). 
61. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("Despite argu-
ments to the contrary which had seemed to me persuasive, it is settled that the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to matters of substantive law as well as to matters of 
procedure."). 
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tude of state, vis-a-vis national, authority over obscenity.62 
Additionally, the equivocal history of the fourteenth amendment 
is quite compatible with these suggestions.63 For instance, it may be 
eminently reasonable to hold (as it has been held) that free speech was 
meant to be more amply protected against the states than other kinds of 
"liberty" interests. 64 By itself, however, that proposition does not settle 
whether state laws affecting speech shall be deemed valid or invalid 
according to the standards applied to acts of Congress. The special 
protection of free speech from hostile state legislation has been agreed 
to by a number of distinguished justices who also believed that the lati-
tude of state and of federal speech regulation is not identical. The 
states, they thought, in some cases should be bound less tightly than 
Congress. 65 Somewhat divergent regimes respecting freedom of speech 
were thus readily available under principles of federalism in the United 
States. A postscript may be appropriate to notice the possibilities of 
this path not taken. 
It may be argued that by refusing to take this path, the Supreme 
Court has more successfully freed speech in the states by sheltering it 
against the passions that local assemblies might translate into laws 
abridging freedom of speech. By subjecting all local and state laws to 
the same rigor of review as the Court has established for acts of Con-
gress, the courts may haye made free speech in the states more robust 
62. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 503 (1957) (dissenting opinion). 
63. The most recent reexamination of this endlessly discussed question, with suitable refer-
ences to the principal previous writings and cases, is Curtis, Tlte Bill of Rights As a Limitation on 
State Authority: A Reply to Profossor Berger, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 45 (1980). As others have 
also noted, Mr. Curtis quite sensibly suggests that the privileges and immunities clause of the 
fourteenth amendment, as compared with the due process clause, is semantically less awkward 
and historically better linked as the principal clanse in the association of substantive rights with 
protection from abridgments by state government. 
64. As suggested by Chief Jnstice Stone in United States v. Carotene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 
144, 152 n.4 (1938): 
There may be a narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality 
when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Coustitu-
tion, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when 
held to be embraced within the Fourteenth. 
Or, as separately defined in the implications of an additional paragraph in the same footnote: 
It is not necessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political 
processes [such as freedom of speech and particularly of political criticism?] which can 
ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected 
to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment than are most other types of legislation. 
65. As suggested by Justice Holmes in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925): 
The general principle of free speech, it seems to me, must be taken to be included in 
the Fourteenth Amendment, in view of the scope that has been given to the word 'liberty' 
as there used, although perhaps it may be accepted with a somewhat larger latitude of 
interpretation than is allowed to Congress by the sweeping language that governs or 
ought to govern the laws of the United States. 
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than it might have been had differential standards been developed 
under the fourteenth amendment than under the first amendment. 
But this kind of reasoning cuts both ways. It is equally arguable 
that had the Supreme Court not tied the review of acts of Congress to 
the standard applied to state and local laws, the Court might well have 
protected free speech more resolutely against Congress than it has. 66 In 
this light, the more serious problem is that at the moment of reviewing 
an act of Congress, the Court cannot help but be aware that it is simul-
taneously setting the standard applicable to the states as well. If the 
Court does not think it appropriate to bind the states very tightly, it 
must adjudicate acts of Congress with the same looseness it thinks ap-
propriate for diverse state or local laws. It is simply a variation on the 
familiar homily that what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. 
Because acts of Congress reach more widely than state or local laws, 
however, it may be a great misfortune to treat them in the same way.67 
There are very few realistic, irresistible counterexamples that can 
be fielded to embarrass a near-absolute construction of the first amend-
ment as applied to acts of Congress. In general, the amendment might 
therefore be applied to acts of Congress with the vigor of the developed 
Holmes-Brandeis formulation. In addition, the first amendment may 
operate collegially with the tenth amendment: it may be read to restrict 
the scope of enumerated powers v~sted in Congress even when, by it-
self, the tenth amendment would not be deemed to do so. This, in es-
sence, is what Mr. Justice Harlan proposed in Roth v. United States.68 
66. Professor Tribe's observation, quoted at note 53 supra, respecting the prudential advan-
tage of the Court's "two-level" address to freedom of speech might apply at least as well in this 
context. 
67. Consider Justice Harlan's observation in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 506 (1957) 
(dissenting opinion): 
The danger is perhaps not great if the people of one State, through their legislature, 
decide that (a given book] goes so far beyond the acceptable standards of candor that it 
will be deemed offensive and non-sellable, for the State next door is still free to make its 
own choice. At least we do not have one uniform standard. But the dangers to free 
thought and expression are truly great if the Federal Government imposes a blanket ban 
over the Nation on such a book. . . . (T]hat the people of one State carmot read some 
(books) seems to me, if not wise or desirable, at least acceptable. But that no person in 
the United States should be allowed to do so seems to be to be intolerable, and violative 
of both the letter and spirit of the First Amendment. 
68. Id at 506-07. This proposal encompasses two separate issues. First, it addresses the 
attenuation of the federal interest (j.e. , the commerce power or postal power may provide little 
foundation for legislating in respect to a variety of subjects of no national significance). Second, it 
assumes the states have the prerogative to experiment with a more robust regime of free speech 
when, indeed, the speech subject-matter that an act of Congress seeks to regulate is not of such 
demonstratable importance to submit it to a fiat, uniform, national policy. 
This is but the logical corollary of the proposition that the extent to which states may restrict 
speech should be at its weakest where states presume to address matters in no way peeuliar to local 
or state concerns but rather address concerns common to the nation at large, e.g., speech deemed 
threatening to national security. See Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 334 (1920) (dissenting 
opinion); Z. CHAFEE, supra note 2, at 285-98. See also Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 
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In that case, an act of Congress prohibited the mailing of "obscene" 
matter in the U.S. mails-an instrumentality over which Congress con-
ventionally has an explicit, enumerated, plenary power. The invoca-
tion of explicit power given to Congress under article I did not, for 
Harlan, end the first amendment inquiry, however. He would have 
drawn from the first amendment a limiting principle qualifying the 
power of Congress in respect to the post office, much as the Court sub-
sequently did in National League of Cities v. Usery. 69 There, the Court 
employed the tenth amendment to limit the reach of an act of Con-
gress, otherwise valid under the commerce clause, when applied to state 
and local employees. Although the post office may be a federal instru-
mentality, the subject of obscenity control is not a federal one, at least 
not significantly. And the toleration of diverse regulation among states, 
under a somewhat more permissive reading of the fourteenth amend-
ment,70 would not present the same nationwide stultification of free 
speech as would a flat, uniform act of Congress. 
In brief, the virtue of a differential first amendment/fourteenth 
amendment regime might be to read the first amendment for all that it 
is worth, confining Congress very tightly. Somewhat more (albeit not 
too much more) play may be left in applying the fourteenth amend-
ment to the processes of state and of local government. If states or local 
communities presumed to enact speech-restricting laws not addressed 
to state or local concerns, but penalizing speech deemed contrary to the 
best national interests or even the best international interest of the 
United States, on the other hand, the Court would have a firm basis for 
applying a very severe version of the free speech clause through the 
fourteenth amendment, in the review of such legislation.71 As a com-
posite of the first and the fourteenth amendments respectively, a suita-
ble graphic that would capture the federalism component of free speech 
analysis might look like this:72 
(1956) (state law presuming to protect United States from possible sedition deemed preempted); 
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (state law imposing additional restrictions on aliens 
deemed preempted). 
69. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Usery was the first case in four decades holding unconstitutional an 
act of Congress under the interstate commerce power. The tenth amendment was found to limit 
the authority of the federal government to regulate wage rates of state and local government 
employees. 
70. See the quotation from Mr. Justice Harlan at note 67 supra. Dissenting in Roth, Harlan 
nonetheless concurred in the companion case of Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), up-
holding a state anti-obscenity statute and relying on the federaHsm distinction that states have 
greater latitude in respect to this subject than does the national government. 
71. See discussion and cases at note 68 supra for the suggestion that the states' police powers 
are weakest in the face of free speech claims when the states presume to act on behalf of interests 
not particular to the state or local community, but on subjects of national concern or of interna-
tional impHcation. 
72. A suitable formulation of framing questions arising under the free speech clause, consis-
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The graphic is essentially self-evident. The universe of speech 
abridgments is divided between two sources: national and state. The 
basis for division is the Constitution, which separately addresses re-
strictions on each source: the first amendment and the fourteenth 
amendment. The Constitution's protection of speech against acts of the 
national government is more substantial, since the first amendment is 
far more emphatic and explicit in protecting speech. The propriety of 
national sources of abridgment is most questionable when the speech 
subject to such abridgment has no unique or apparent national conse-
quence and thus, drawing from implications of the tenth amendment, 
Congress' reliance upon enumerated powers may be treated skeptically. 
A fairly rugged application of the first amendment, however, is still to 
be expected even when acts of Congress deal with speech generating 
evils highly appropriate for congressional concern. Insofar as a uni-
form nationwide restriction must generally operate more suffocatingly 
than piecemeal local or diverse state patterns of restriction, moreover, 
the argument in favor of confining Congress tightly is pragmatically 
tent with our review of the subject up to that point, is suggested in note 57 supra. If one were to 
incorporate an appropriate federalism element as well, then the issue in each case might be framed 
as follows: 
The question in each case is whether the circumstances were sufficiently compelling to 
justify the degree of infringement resulting from the law, given the relationship of the 
speech abridged to the presuppositions of the first amendment, and the relationship of 
the law to the responsibilities of the level of government that has presumed to act 
It is, of course, the last phrase ("the relationship of the law to the responsibilities of the level of 
government that has presumed to act") that identifies the federalism component. 
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strengthened. A looser regime may be tolerated in respect to state leg-
islation under the looser text (and history) of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Overall, a fiat and stale sameness of restrictions is less likely and 
the erosion of substantial diversity of expression across the nation is 
less to be feared. The propriety of state and local abridgments of 
speech loses its own justification, however, when subjects of national 
concern are at issue. Such abridgments, if made at all, must be made 
by Congress and not by a gratuitous gesture of state or local 
legislatures. 
Finally, of course, the federalism graphic is not meant to be indif-
ferent to our previous review. At both the state and national level, for 
instance, the imminence and seriousness of the evil to be avoided are 
still issues. And the subject matter of the speech may continue to make 
a considerable difference. Talk about local political issues, candidates, 
and policies may be as rigorously protected from state or local laws by 
the fourteenth amendment as talk about national political issues, candi-
dates, and policies shall be protected against abridging acts of Congress 
by the first amendment. In these and other respects the federalism 
graphic does not exclude our earlier efforts. Rather, it complements 
them. Its addition may reflect a more mature treatment of the subject 
as a whole. 
CONCLUSION 
In a dictum that has often been derided, Mr. Justice Roberts once 
declared: 
When an act of Congress is appropriately challenged in the courts as 
not conforming to the constitutional mandate, the judicial branch of 
the Government has only one duty-to lay the article of the Constitu-
tion which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to de-
cide whether the latter squares with the former.73 
It is not derision that ought to characterize such an effort, however, but 
sympathy and a good faith desire to make it work. Among the many 
clauses of the Constitution, moreover, the free speech clause appears to 
be one of those best suited for this view of the judicial duty. The clause 
is exceptional in its brevity, its clarity, and its use of concrete terms. 
Ostensibly, it can be taken literally. And constitutionally, it is worthy 
of being taken seriously. 
Yet, as we have seen, laying the free speech clause beside a partic-
ular statute has left even highly conscientious judges doubtful as to 
whether ''the latter squares with the former." We have now traced 
nearly a dozen quite different pictures of the free speech clause. None 
73. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936). 
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was at odds with the language of the amendment. Few are foreclosed 
by any fair assessment of its history or its past judicial exposition. 
Each, moreover, is fraught with its own problems, and virtually all con-
fide an unavoidable margin of textually uncertain discretion in our 
courts. What, then, may one conclude? 
Toward the end of this review, some effort was made to fit together 
compatible ideas derived from several graphics by summarizing in 
words what courts should look to in determining whether "the latter 
squares with the former," ie., whether, as applied, a statute squares 
with the first or fourteenth amendment. Two composite statements 
were proposed in the footnotes-one summarizing a comprehensive 
first amendment standard and the other incorporating fourteenth 
amendment impacts as well. 74 In context, i e. , given meaning and spec-
ificity by the discussion in this Article, each may offer some assistance. 
Even so, they are not the main point of this Article as they do not an-
swer well as "substitutes" for the first amendment itself. Tom loose 
from the immediate context of this Article, each is too cumbeciome a 
proposition to be worthy of comparison with the first amendment's own 
words, which are so much more powerful and so much less facile. In-
fusing our surrogate rephrasings with every advantage of rigor and 
clarification that may be wrung from all of our preceding discussion, 
moreover, provides no assurance that, if adopted by courts as the work-
ing equivalent of the first amendment, either would be treated in fact 
with due rigor. On their face, they most assuredly lessen the burden for 
those who are hostile to speech they have no interest in defending 
against other interests they transiently prefer. 
In no sense, then, should such surrogate formulations be regarded 
as literal substitutes for the first amendment, ie., as replacements of the 
amendment's own terms. Indeed, one may rightly argue that it remains 
vital in every case to start with the free speech clause itself. The singu-
lar value of the clause is that it quite properly throws onto the adver-
sary of speech the whole weight of what ought to be a very heavy 
burden indeed. The first amendment is difficult to improve upon in 
that regard; no different formulation readily occurs to us that is nearly 
so demanding and excellent. If, then, despite their obvious difficulties, 
the suggestions advanced in the footnotes75 are useful, it is not as a 
displacement or substitute for the first amendment. Rather, it is as but 
a way of describing what one should minimally expect to encounter in 
the course of attempting to discharge the burden imposed by the first 
and fourteenth amendments. 
Even when understood in this different, more subdued fashion, it 
74. See notes 57 & 72 supra. 
75. Id 
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may fairly be said of our efforts that something has somehow been mis-
reported or left out of account: that despite our best intention, too 
much has been given away. Surely that criticism may be true, although 
it is difficult to see the error in light of the problems we encountered 
along the full course of argument we have now pursued. Still, it is far 
better to think we have been unfair to the first amendment in giving too 
much away than to belittle that amendment, make light of it, or think 
we have gained an easy repose against its demands. That embarrass-
ment should remain with us at the end. When the clause has been un-
raveled, its precedential applications examined, an equivocal early 
history acknowledged, and other plausibly helpful matters tried on for 
"fit," considerable doubt and uncertainty should remain. Two centu-
ries removed from its original enunciation, we still see the free speech 
clause as "through a glass, darkly."76 
76. 1 Corinthians 13:12. 
